RETHINKING MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE AGE OF AMERICA FIRST
I joined the Marine Corps because Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. I was young, but not confused.
A dictator had crossed a border with tanks, absorbed a weaker neighbor, and dared the world to respond.
President George H. W. Bush did respond. He assembled a coalition, liberated Kuwait, and then stopped.
At the time, I felt frustration. If Saddam was the problem, why leave him in power? Why halt the advance when the job seemed half done?
I believed, as many did, that the first Gulf War should have ended with regime change in Baghdad.
That early conviction shaped my support for later wars. When we went into Afghanistan and then Iraq, I did not recoil. I thought we were finishing unfinished business. I thought we could remove tyrants and midwife stable democracies. I thought American power, applied with moral clarity, could reshape broken regimes.
But the decades that followed chastened that confidence.
We discovered that removing a regime is easier than replacing it. We discovered that democracy building is not an export commodity. We discovered that intelligence agencies and development bureaucracies cannot engineer legitimacy from abroad.
Endless deployments and open-ended missions taught many of us a difficult lesson. The U.S. should not be in the business of remaking other nations in its own image. We are not good at it, and it does not work.
But….

The puzzle pieces are falling into place faster than the Deep State ever imagined. The case against the Clintons as a crime family, which I laid out in 2019 when I discussed their 







How do destructive ideas and bouts of collective madness so quickly become policy, law, and the status quo? After all, most have little public support — and are not Western nations supposedly rationally governed?
